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NOTES

hoped -that -the return to reason demonstrated by these changes will result in
fewer limitations being struck down because of the fever engendered by the
great legal disease. Neither justice nor public policy is served by refusal to effect
the intent of a person as to the disposition of his property, simply because his
attorney failed to understand the labyrinthine tunnels of the rule against perpetuities in California.
Sandra S. Terzian*
Member, Second Year Class.

CAPACITY OF TRUSTEES OF CHARITABLE
CORPORATION TO SUE CO-TRUSTEES
TO ENJOIN BREACH OF TRUST
In a recent California case, Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and
Surgeons,' the California Supreme Court held that the minority trustees of a
charitable corporation had capacity to institute proceedings in behalf of the
corporation against the majority -trustees to enjoin a threatened breach of trust.
This decision overruled an earlier California case, George Pepperdine Foundation
v. Pepperdine,2 which held that only the attorney general had capacity to institute proceedings to enforce a charitable trust.
Holt involved an action brought by three trustees of defendant College of
Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons (hereinafter COPS), a California charitable
corporation. The other defendants were the twenty-three remaining trustees on
the COPS board of trustees and the attorney general. The attorney general was
joined as a party defendant because the suit involved the breach of a charitable
trust. The attorney general filed an answer to the complaint denying the capacity
of plaintiffs to institute such proceedings without the consent of the attorney
general. The attorney general contended that he was the only one empowered to
161 A.C. 815, 394 P.2d 932, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1964). Justice McComb, dissenting,
thought that the doctrine of stare decisis should be followed. He felt that since the

Pepperdine decision had become established California law it should not be overruled.
This argument is quite illogical in the sense that once an erroneous decision has been
rendered by the courts, it should not be perpetuated and become binding upon future
litigants simply because it is convenient for the court.
2 126 Cal. App. 2d 154, 271 P.2d 600 (1954). Pepperdine involved an action by a
charitable corporation against its former directors for damages resulting from breach

of trust by the defendants during their incumbencies. The court held that the attorney
general was the only person qualified to maintain an action
trust. The court apparently balked at the notion that the
former director, whose lavish contributions of capital and
Foundation into existence in the first place, for what were

on behalf of a charitable
corporation could sue its
energy had brought the
essentially only errors in

business judgment in the administration of the fund he himself set up. "Reason, justice,
equity and law stand aghast at the judgment proposed...." Id. at 161, 271 P.2d at 605.
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bring suit; that since he failed to consent to the plaintiffs bringing this action they
lacked the requisite standing. As an affirmative defense the attorney general stated
that the alleged threatened breach of irust did not exist since the trust funds would
continue to be applied for the public benefit.$ The defendant trustees demurred to
the complaint and the trial court sustained the demurrer on the grounds that
plaintiffs had no capacity to bring this action. From this decision the plaintiffs
appealed.
In determining the capacity of plaintiff trustees to bring this action the Supreme Court was faced with having to answer two important questions of law.
First, may one or more of several trustees of a charitable trust sue the other
trustees to enjoin a breach of the trust, or may only the attorney general maintain
such an action? Second, does the form of the entity of the charitable trustwhether it is a common law charitable -trust or a charitable corporation-make a
difference in determining who may sue to enforce the trust? The first question is
important in that it involves an area of California law which is uncertain and in
need of clarification. 4 The second question raises a point of law which has never
been directly before a California court.5
Capacity of Trustees
It is widely accepted that the attorney general, as representative of the public,
which is in effect the beneficiary of any charitable -trust, has the primary obligation of enforcing the proper use of charitable trust funds, and is usually a necessary party to any suit affecting the public interest in the trust.6 However, the
prevailing view of other jurisdictions is that the attorney general does not have
exclusive power to enforce a charitable trust and that a trustee or other person7
having a sufficient special interest may also institute proceedings for this purpose.
This is the position adopted by legal commentators 8 and the American Law
Institute. 9 The majority view was followed by the California courts prior to the
8 Plaintiff trustees alleged that it was the intention of the defendant trustees to
repudiate the charitable trust purpose of COPS to conduct an osteopathic medical
school by converting COPS to an allopathic medical school, a distinct and separate school
of medicine. 61 A.C. at 824-825, 394 P.2d at 932, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
4 Compare George Pepperdine Foundation v. Pepperdine, 126 Cal. App. 2d 154, 271
P.2d 600 (1954), with St. James Church v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 2d 352, 287
P.2d 387 (1955).
5
See St. James Church v. Superior Court, supra note 4.
8
Estate of Schloss, 56 Cal. 2d 248, 363 P.2d 875, 14 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1961); People
ex rel. Ellert v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 45 Pac. 270 (1896); McGee v. Vandeventer,
326 IMI.
425, 158 N.E. 127 (1927); Andover Theological Seminary v. Theological Inst.,
253 Mass. 256, 148 N.E. 900 (1925).
7
Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235, 11 S.W.2d 278 (1928); DiCristofaro v. Laurel
Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 128 A.2d 281 (App. Div. 1957); Trustees of
Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Carmody, 158 App. Div. 738, 144 N.Y. Supp. 24 (1913).
84 ScoTT, TRusTs § 391 (2d ed. 1956); Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable
Dollar:An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HArv. L. REV. 433, 443-49 (1959-1960).
) "A suit can be maintained for the-enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attomey General or other public officer, or by a co-trustee, or by a person who has a
special interest in the enforcement of the charitable ust... ." RESTATEMNT (SEcOND),
TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
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Pepperdine decision 0 and in at least one ease after the Pepperdine decision."
California Corporations Code sections 9505 and 10207 provide that if there
is a failure to comply with a charitable trust "... the Attorney General shall
institute, in the name of the state, the proceedings necessary to correct the noncompliance or departure."' 2 The Pepperdine court gave an extremely narrow interpretation to these code sections in promulgating the rule that only the attorney
general had the capacity to bring an action to enforce a charitable trust. This
interpretation is quite illogical in the sense that it tends to defeat the primary
purpose of the legislation.
The basic reason behind the role which the State has imposed upon the
attorney general has been an attempt to alleviate the problem presented by the
lack of a party plaintiff to enforce charitable trusts.' 3 This problem stems from the
fact that the beneficiaries of a charitable trust, unlike the beneficiaries of a private
trust, are ordinarily indefinite members of the general public. Usually there are
no members of the general public with sufficient interest or knowledge to bring an
action. Even if there were such individuals, the law does not recognize their
right to bring an action on the rationale -thatto do so would subject the charitable
14
trust to harassing litigation.
Thus, it is clearly evident that the primary purpose of sections 9505 and
10207 of the Corporations Code is to provide for the efficient supervision and
enforcement of charitable trusts. If this is true, then there is no logic in the
proposition that trustees of the charitable -trust or other persons with a sufficient
special interest should not be allowed to institute proceedings to prevent a breach
of -the-trust. It has been pointed out "the attorney general, without great fault on
his part, has proved a poor guardian of the welfare of charitable gifts."' 5 The
reason for this is that the attorney general usually lacks detailed knowledge
regarding .the purpose for which the trust was created.' 6 On the other hand,
1o See Pratt v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 15 Cal. App. 2d 630, 59 P.2d 862
(1936); O'Hara v. Grand Lodge of I.O.G.T., 213 Cal. 131, 2 P.2d 21 (1931).
"1See St. James Church v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 2d 352, 287 P.2d 387
(1955).
12 California Corporations Code sections 9505 and 10207 subject a' non-profit
corporation which holds property "subject to any public or charitable trust" (section
9505), or a charitable corporation (section 10207), to examination by the attorney
general on behalf of the state "to ascertain the condition of its affairs and to what
extent, if at all, [it] ...may depart from the general purposes for which it is formed.
In case of any such failure or departure the Attorney General shall institute, in the
name of the State, the proceedings necessary to correct the noncompliance or
departure."
IsHolt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 61 A.C. 815, 819, 394 P.2d
932, 935,40 Cal. Rptr. 244,247 (1964).
14 Pratt v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 15 Cal. App. 2d 630, 59 P.2d 862 (1936);
Barker v. Hauberg, 325 Ill. 538, 156 N.E. 806 (1927); Dillaway v. Burton, 256 Mass.
568, 153 N.E. 13 (1926); Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235, 11 S.W.2d 278 (1928).
'5 Bogert Proposed Legislation Regarding Supervision of Charities, 52 MIcH. L.
REv. 633,
634 (1954).
' 6 This point is quite evident from the facts of the Holt case. The attorney general
had answered the complaint denying the existence of the alleged breach of trust on the
basis that the trust funds would continue to be used for the public benefit. The supreme
court on appeal held that a change from osteopathic to allopathic medicine did con-
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trustees are the persons best situated to enforce the trust. "The charity's own
representative has at least as much interest in preserving the charitable funds as
does the attorney general who represents the general public. The cotrustee is also
in the best position to learn about breaches of trust and to bring the relevant facts
to the courts attention."17
In Holt the court gave a broad construction to Corporations Code sections
9505 and 10207 in holding that there was nothing in these sections which precluded trustees from bringing an action to enforce the trust.1 8 "The attorney
general... should continue to be responsible for protecting and supervising charities, but he should be thought of as the representative of the beneficiaries-the
public--and not as a substitute for a -trusteeor director who is individually responsible."' 9 The public interest, as well as the interest of the donor to a charitable
trust, can best be served if the power of the attorney general to enforce such
trusts is supplemented by -the -trustees or other persons with a sufficient special
interest in the trust. This is certainly the most logical approach to -the problem of
enforcing charitable trusts. The holding in Pepperdine is plainly erroneous since
it goes against the authority, logic and public policy considerations involved in
the problem.
The Pepperdine decision would appear to be the unfortunate result of a
misapplication of a generally accepted principle concerning charitable trusts. This
principle is stated as follows:
The purpose of vesting in some public official like the Attorney General the
exclusive power to begin proceedings to enforce charitable trusts is obvious.
The beneficiaries of such trusts are usually some or all of a large shifting class
of the public. If any member of this class who deemed himself qualified might
begin suit, the trustee would frequently be subjected to unreasonable and
vexatious litigation.2
This principle carried to its illogical extreme will result in a decision such as
Pepperdine. The term "exclusive" should be construed as pertaining only to
members of the general public with no other interest in the charitable trust than
possibly a claim as a potential beneficiary. The courts should be careful not to
confuse the position of an ordinary member of the general public and a trustee
charged with the duty of administering the charitable trust.
Should Charitable CorporationsBe Distinguished from
Charitable Trusts?
Should the courts draw a distinction between the form of the charitable
entity, i.e., whether a common law charitable trust or a charitable corporation, in
determining whether ,the trustee or director has the capacity -to bring an action
to enforce the trust?2 ' In this respect Holt was a case of first impression and the
stitute a breach of the charitable trust purpose thereby pointing out the error in the
attorney general's judgment. 61 A.C. at 820, 394 P.2d at 938, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
17 Karst, supra note 8, at 444.
18 61 A.C. at 819, 394 P.2d at 935, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
19 Karst, supra note 8, at 445.
20
BoaERT, TR-usTs AND TnusTEs § 414 (2d ed. 1960).
21
Such a distinction would be important as to whether the law applicable to
corporations is applied or whether the law applying to charitable trusts is applied. In
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court answered this question in the negative; this would appear to be a sound
and logical treatment of the problem. In a purely technical sense there is a distinction between the trustee of a charitable trust and the trustee or director of
a charitable corporation. 22 But for the problem at hand there is no practical
distinction. The functions of both the trustee of a charitable trust and the director
of a charitable corporation are identical. In both cases they are fiduciaries in
performing their trust duties 23 and are the ones solely responsible for administer24
ing -the trust assets.
Those cases which have involved suits by directors or trustees of charitable
corporations have all held that the directors had the capacity to bring the action.25
The courts have so held without attempting to draw a distinction between a
trustee of a charitable trust and a director of a charitable corporation. It has
generally been stated -that "the principles and rules applicable to charitable trusts
are applicable to charitable corporations."26 The primary concern should be a
policy which promotes the efficient enforcement of and strict adherence to the
trust purposes. This can best be achieved by not attempting to draw an unrealistic
distinction between a trustee of a charitable trust and a director of a charitable
corporation. The fiduciary function which both perform is identical. Therefore,
they should both be extended the same legal processes for performing their
fiduciary duties.
Conclusion
If the public is to receive the maximum benefit from charitable trusts it is essential that the charities be properly supervised. Logically, the trustees, be they
trustees of a 6haritable trust or directors of a charitable corporation, are the
persons best situated to enforce the trust. There is no sound reason for holding
otherwise. Safeguarding -the charitable trust from harassing litigation has always
been a prime concern of the courts. The safeguards which have been established
are in no sense violated by allowing trustees to institute proceedings to prevent a
breach of the charitable trust purpose. The policy adopted by the California court
in Holt is in accord with the majority view. It has brought clarity and uniformity
to California law in the area of charitable trusts.
Gerald E. Riggs*
California it has been held that the minority directors of a private business corporation
could not initiate an action in behalf of the corporation against the other directors.
Sealand Inv. Corp. v. Emprise, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 305, 12 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1961).
22 "Even in the case of a charitable corporation the members of the board of
management, whether called directors or trustees, are not trustees in the strict sense,
since the title to the property of the corporation is in the corporation and not in them."
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 16, comment a at 52 (1959); see Brown v. Memorial
Nat'l Home Foundation, 162 Cal. App. 2d 513, 329 P.2d 118 (1958).
23 See CAL. CoRp. CODE § 9500.
24 See St. James Church v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 2d 352, 287 P.2d 387
(1955).

25 See St. James Church v. Superior Court, supra note 24; Wiegand v. Barnes
Foundation, 374 Pa. 149, 97 A.2d 81 (1953); Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary, 219 So. Car.
174, 264 S.E.2d 524 (1951).
6 PLEsTATEmNT (SEcoND), TRusTS § 348, comment f at 212 (1959).
* Member, Second Year Class.

